Most Hungarians want better relations with EU after years of Orbán Brussels-bashing, poll finds

Exclusive: Survey published days before election in which anti-EU prime minister risks being ousted after 16 years

After years of relentless EU-bashing by their nationalist, illiberal prime minister, an overwhelming majority of Hungary’s voters back its membership of the bloc, and most – including many of Viktor Orbán’s voters – now want a new approach to Brussels.

Days before elections at which Orbán, who has consistently painted the EU as an enemy of the Hungarian people, risks being ousted after 16 years in power, a poll has shown a huge appetite for a recalibration of the country’s relations with the bloc.

The survey, by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) thinktank, found that 77% of voters support EU membership; three-quarters of respondents “trust” the bloc; and 68% want at least some degree of change in Hungary’s EU engagement.

Orbán has battled with Brussels – which has suspended billions of euros in funding – over a wide range of policies including on justice, migration, LGBTQ+ rights and aid for Ukraine, which, along with sanctions against Russia, he has consistently blocked.

EU leaders have largely steered clear of commenting on Sunday’s vote to avoid accusations of seeking to influence it, but Orbàn’s status as a far-right icon in Europe and beyond makes the election the bloc’s most consequential this year.

While the desire for change was strongest (91%) among supporters of Péter Magyar, the centre-right challenger whose Tisza party leads Orbán’s Fidesz by a double-digit margin in recent polls, nearly half (45%) of Fidesz voters also wanted a reset.

Majorities of Fidesz voters also said they supported Hungary’s continued membership of the EU (65%) and “trusted” the bloc (64%), while a large minority (43%, compared with 66% in the population as a whole) even backed Hungary joining the euro.

The survey revealed “a different Hungary from the one Orbán sells to Europe and his friends around the world”, suggesting the next government would have a mandate to strike a “very different approach” to relations with the EU, its authors said.

“The poll shows most Hungarians do not share their prime minister’s conception of the EU as an enemy, nor do they align consistently with his other preferences and grievances,” ECFR researchers Piotr Buras and Pawel Zerka said.

However, the poll suggested domestic issues, rather than the EU, were the key factor for many voters. Asked to give the main reason for their choice of vote, 40% of Tisza voters said “a desire for change”; 27% of Fidesz voters said “peace and security”.

Asked to choose from a list of the most important issues they felt were facing Hungary, most Tisza voters opted for corruption and governance (31%), public services (18%) and the cost of living and inflation (17%). Fidesz voters chose energy security (22%), and cost of living and inflation (20%).

The survey, carried out between 26 March and 1 April, also showed that if Orbán’s combative and disruptive approach to EU relations had failed to mobilise his voters, his anti-Ukraine rhetoric appeared to have cut through more effectively.

Tisza voters clearly differed from Fidesz supporters in considering Ukraine as chiefly Hungary’s “partner”, rather than as an “adversary”, the poll found – but shared the latter’s scepticism about future financial aid for Kyiv and Ukraine’s bid to join the EU.

While a majority (57%) of Tisza voters say they would like “very different approach” to the war in Ukraine than the current government’s, the poll showed, that does not mean they are differ radically from Fidesz voters in their views on specific policies.

Fidesz voters, for example, overwhelmingly reject (85%) further financial support for Kyiv, but Tisza voters were divided (48% in favour; 45% opposed). Likewise, 83% of Fidesz supporters oppose Ukraine’s EU membership, but Tisza voters split 50%-40%.

When it comes to perceptions of Russia, voters of the two camps differed radically, with just 6% of Fidesz voters perceiving Moscow as an adversary compared with 40% of Tisza voters. Similar deep splits were evident on other foreign policy questions.

Taken together, the authors said, while Budapest – if Tisza emerges victorious – can be expected to be more cooperative towards Brussels, there are limits to how constructive a foreign policy partner Hungary could become, especially on Ukraine.

“Hungary’s EU partners would be wise not expect a complete U-turn on foreign policy. Old habits may die hard [concerning Ukraine] given their potential divisiveness among Tisza voters and generally negative opinions among Hungarians,” they said.

The authors also warned that a change of government would first and foremost require “Hungary’s own house to be put in order first”, so European leaders should “work with the new government to establish what the new normal should mean”.